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Despite a growing interest in channel coordination, no detailed analytical or numerical results measuring its impact on
system performance have been reported in the literature. Hence, this paper aims to develop analytical and numerical results
documenting the system-wide cost improvement rates that are due to coordination. To this end, we revisit the classical
buyer–vendor coordination problem introduced by Goyal [S.K. Goyal, An integrated inventory model for a single-supplier
single-customer problem. International Journal of Production Research 15 (1976) 107–111] and extended by Toptal et al.
[A. Toptal, S. C¸etinkaya, C.-Y. Lee, The buyer–vendor coordination problem: modeling inbound and outbound cargo
capacity and costs, IIE Transactions on Logistics and Scheduling 35 (2003) 987–1002] to consider generalized replenish-
ment costs under centralized decision making. We analyze (i) how the counterpart centralized and decentralized solutions
diﬀer from each other, (ii) under what circumstances their implications are similar, and (iii) the eﬀect of generalized replen-
ishment costs on the system-wide cost improvement rates that are due to coordination. First, considering Goyal’s basic
setting, we show that the improvement rate depends on cost parameters. We characterize this dependency analytically,
develop analytical bounds on the improvement rate, and identify the problem instances in which considerable savings
can be achieved through coordination. Next, we analyze Toptal et al.’s [A. Toptal, S. C¸etinkaya, C.-Y. Lee, The
buyer–vendor coordination problem: modeling inbound and outbound cargo capacity and costs, IIE Transactions on
Logistics and Scheduling 35 (2003) 987–1002] extended setting that considers generalized replenishment costs representing
inbound and outbound transportation considerations, and we present detailed numerical results quantifying the value of
coordination. We report signiﬁcant improvement rates with and without explicit transportation considerations, and we
present numerical evidence which suggests that larger rates are more likely in the former case.
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The buyer–vendor coordination problem is one of the classical research areas in the multi-echelon inven-
tory literature. A fundamental stream of research in this area, known as centralized modeling, recommends
integrating and solving the decision problems of the buyer and the vendor together, e.g., [2,4–6,8]. Although
this approach provides the best result in terms of total system-wide proﬁt/cost, it may not be feasible or desir-
able in many practical cases due to incentive conﬂicts. The alternative approach, known as decentralized mod-
eling, suggests that the buyer and the vendor solve their decision problems independently of each other.
However, the total system proﬁts resulting from the centralized approach are superior to those resulting from
the corresponding decentralized approach.
In other words, decentralized models often result in lost proﬁts for the system when compared to centralized
models. As a remedy, another line of research in the literature proposes an alternative approach that relies on
using the proﬁt/cost gap between the centralized and decentralized approaches as an inducement to improve
decentralized solutions, e.g., [9,10,12]. This alternative approach, known as channel coordination, requires the
decentralized solution to be improved in a way that (i) it results in the same values for the decision variables
as the centralized solution, and (ii) it suggests amutually agreeable way of sharing the resulting proﬁts. The shar-
ing can be done by means of quantity discounts, rebates, refunds, and ﬁxed payments between the parties, or
some combination of these. All of thesemethods represent diﬀerent forms of incentive schemes, or so-called coor-
dination mechanisms, whose terms can be made explicit under a contract. Consequently, the output of channel
coordination, i.e., the coordinated solution, combines the beneﬁts of both centralized and decentralized solutions.
Despite a growing interest in channel coordination over the past few decades [1,4,9,10,15,12,14], no detailed
analytical or numerical results measuring its impact on system performance have been reported in the literature.
For this reason, we revisit the classical buyer–vendor coordination problem introduced by Goyal [4] (called
Goyal’s Problem from now on) and extended by Toptal et al. [13]. Goyal’s basic setting assumes that both the
buyer and the vendor operate under the assumptions of the deterministic constant demand EOQ model with
the traditional inventory holding and ﬁxed replenishment costs. Toptal et al. [13] take a broader view of this set-
ting to consider generalized replenishment cost structures representing inbound and outbound transportation
considerations. More speciﬁcally, Toptal et al. [13] ﬁrst consider the case where the vendor’s replenishment cost
includes a stepwise inbound transportation cost component, representing the cargo cost (called Problem I from
nowon). They then extend the problem setting to consider the casewhere both the vendor and the buyer are subject
to stepwise transportation costs (called Problem II from now on). Clearly, Goyal’s Problem is a special case of
Problems I and II, and the current paper is aimed at providing analytical and numerical results documenting the
system-wide cost improvement rates that are due to coordination in all of these three problem settings . Since
Toptal et al. [13] focus on centralizedmodels only andGoyal [4] does not investigate channel coordinationmech-
anisms, here we investigate the counterpart decentralized models, develop eﬀective channel coordination mech-
anisms, and quantify the value of channel coordination through a comparison of the counterpart centralized and
decentralized solutions of Problems I and II as well as Goyal’s Problem.
Making an analytical comparison of the centralized and decentralized solutions for Goyal’s Problem for
certain parameter ranges, we are able to develop analytical results1 representing the improvement rates result-
ing from channel coordination. These analytical results are useful in characterizing the relationship between
the improvement rates and the underlying model parameters that have a direct impact on the magnitude of
these improvements. Our analytical results reveal two important insights. First, the value of coordination
depends on two important ratios that can be expressed in terms of the critical cost parameters. Secondly,
the value of coordination does not depend on the demand rate, i.e., the demand rate is not a critical model
parameter for our purposes. Furthermore, by developing bounds on the improvement rates, we identify the
problem instances for which considerable savings can be achieved through coordination. However, unlike
Goyal’s Problem, insightful analytical results, representing the improvement rates due to channel coordina-
tion, cannot be obtained for Problems I and II, i.e., under generalized replenishment costs. Hence, in these
cases, we rely on a detailed numerical study for quantifying the value of coordination.1 See Corollary 1 and Proposition 5.
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under what circumstances their implications are similar, we quantify the value of coordination both analyti-
cally and numerically, with and without explicit transportation considerations. We report that the maximum
achievable improvement rates under coordination are greater under explicit transportation considerations,
i.e., under generalized replenishment costs, and we document that our analytical results for Goyal’s Problem,
i.e., the case without generalized replenishment costs, prove to be useful for a careful numerical investigation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The general problem setting is discussed next in Section
2 where a summary of the notation is also presented. Section 3 revisits Goyal’s Problem and provides an in-
depth analysis in the context of quantifying the value of coordination. Section 4 concentrates on the extended
setting with generalized replenishment cost structures, and develops speciﬁc results for quantifying the value of
coordination. Section 5 presents our numerical results and a summary of their interpretation and implications.
Section 6 concludes the paper.2. General problem setting and notation
We use the index ‘‘w’’ to represent the parameters and decision variables of the vendor (warehouse) and ‘‘r’’
to represent the parameters and decision variables of the buyer (retailer). The buyer faces a constant demand
rate, denoted by D, over an inﬁnite horizon; and, given the costs of inventory replenishment and holding for
both parties, the problem is to compute the minimum cost replenishment order quantities for the vendor and
the buyer so that the demand can be satisﬁed. The vendor’s and the buyer’s replenishment order quantities are
denoted by Qw and Qr, respectively. In this context, Qw represents the size of an inbound shipment for the
buyer–vendor pair whereas Qr represents the size of an outbound shipment. The buyer’s replenishment cycle
length, denoted Tr, is given by Qr/D. The vendor’s replenishment cycle length, denoted Tw, is given by
Tw = nTr where n is a positive integer denoting the number of buyer replenishments within a replenishment
cycle of the vendor. It follows that Qw = nQr. Notation associated with the cost parameters is introduced
in Table 1 which also includes a summary of the notation introduced so far and that will be used throughout
the rest of the paper.
Since the focus of the paper is on diﬀerent replenishment cost structures, we denote the replenishment cost
of party j, where j = w,r, by CjðQjÞ which, naturally, is a function of Qj, the order quantity of party j. In gen-
eral terms, this function can be represented byTable
Notati
i
j
n
ni
Qi
Gw(Qr,
Gr(Qr)
G(Qr,n
CjðQjÞ
Kj
Rj
Pj
hj
h 0
Qj
Tj
D
cCjðQjÞ ¼ Kj þ
Qj
P j
 
Rj; ð1Þ1
on
Index referring to the modeling approach. i = d: decentralized, i = c: centralized
Index referring to the parties in the system. j = w: vendor, j = r: retailer
Number of buyer replenishments within a vendor replenishment cycle
(Tw = nTr, and thus Qr = Qw/n)
Optimum value of n using Modeling Approach i
Buyer’s optimum order quantity using Modeling Approach i
n) Vendor’s average annual cost function
Buyer’s average annual cost function
) System-wide cost function G(Qr,n) = Gw(Qr,n) + Gr(Qr)
Replenishment cost function of party j as a function of Qj
Fixed replenishment cost of party j
Per cargo/truck cost of party j
Per cargo/truck capacity of party j
Holding cost per-unit per-unit-time of party j
Echelon holding cost (h0 = hr  hw > 0)
Order quantity of party j
Replenishment cycle length of party j
Buyer’s/retailer’s demand rate
Vendor’s unit price without channel coordination
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party j, respectively. Hence, the three settings of interest in this paper, i.e., Goyal’s Problem and Problems I
and II, can be represented by setting the parameters of functions CjðQjÞ, j = w, r, as follows:
• In Goyal’s Problem, both the buyer’s and vendor’s cargo costs are ignored, i.e., Rj = 0, j = w,r, or, equiv-
alently, Pj !1, j = w,r, so that each party incurs only a ﬁxed cost given by Kj + Rj, j = w,r.
• In Problem I, the buyer’s cargo costs are ignored whereas the vendor’s cargo costs are modeled explicitly,
i.e., Rr = 0 (or, equivalently, Pr !1 so that the buyer incurs only a ﬁxed cost given by Kr + Rr) whereas
Rw = R > 0 and Pw = P <1.
• In Problem II, both the buyer’s and vendor’s cargo costs are modeled explicitly under the assumption that
the per cargo costs and capacities of the individual parties are identical, i.e., Pj = P <1 and Rj = R > 0,
j = w, r.
Recalling that Qw = nQr, it is easy to show that the vendor’s, buyer’s, and system-wide average annual cost
functions can be expressed asTable
Decen
Decen
Buyer’
min
s.t.GwðQr; nÞ ¼ CwðnQrÞ
D
nQr
þ hw ðn 1ÞQr
2
; ð2Þ
GrðQrÞ ¼ CrðQrÞ
D
Qr
þ hr Qr
2
; and ð3Þ
GðQr; nÞ ¼ CwðnQrÞ
D
nQr
þ hw ðn 1ÞQr
2
þ CrðQrÞ
D
Qr
þ hr Qr
2
; ð4Þrespectively. In the tradition of the classical channel coordination papers, e.g., [10,15], for our decentralized
models, we focus on the case where the buyer’s economic order quantity problem, i.e., the buyer’s subproblem,
is solved ﬁrst. The formulations of the corresponding decentralized and centralized models are given in Table 2
where Qd is the optimal solution of the Buyer’s Subproblem, as deﬁned in Table 1.
As we have already mentioned, our analysis builds on an investigation of Goyal’s Problem which is dis-
cussed in detail below. Before concluding this section, we deﬁneIR ¼ Total decentralized costs Total centralized costs
Total decentralized costs
 
 100%; ð5Þso that IR represents the improvement rate resulting from channel coordination, and, hence, we use it for
quantifying the value of coordination for the problems considered in this paper.3. Analysis of Goyal’s problem: Rw = Rr = 0
In this case, Expressions (2)–(4) reduce toGrðQrÞ ¼
KrD
Qr
þ hrQr
2
and ð6Þ2
tralized and centralized formulations
tralized model Centralized model
s subproblem Vendor’s subproblem
Gr(Qr) min GwðQd; nÞ min G(Qr,n)
QrP 0 s.t. n: a positive integer s.t. QrP 0
n: a positive integer
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KwD
nQr
þ hwðn 1ÞQr
2
; and ð7Þ
GðQr; nÞ ¼
ðKw þ nKrÞD
nQr
þ ðnhw þ h
0ÞQr
2
ð8Þand Goyal [4] provides the following solutions for the corresponding centralized and decentralized
formulations:
Solution to the Decentralized modelndðnd  1Þ 6
Kwhr
Krhw
6 ndðnd þ 1Þ; ð9Þ
Qd ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KrD
hr
s
: ð10ÞSolution to the Centralized modelncðnc  1Þ 6
Kwh
0
Krhw
6 ncðnc þ 1Þ: ð11Þ
Qc ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2DðKr þ Kw=ncÞ
nchw þ h0
s
: ð12ÞUsing these earlier results, we ﬁrst discuss the beneﬁts due to coordination in this simplistic setting. We assume
that cD GwðQd; ndÞ > 0 so that the decentralized transactional setting makes economical sense for the ven-
dor, and the vendor seeks to improve his/her proﬁt using the centralized transactional setting as a benchmark.
Utilizing Expressions 9,11,10,12, the following two propositions compare the optimum values of n and Qr
in the decentralized and centralized solutions of Goyal’s Problem. This comparison is important in developing
the analytical results for IR given by Expression (5) in which the centralized transactional setting is used as a
benchmark.
Proposition 1. The buyer’s optimum order quantity in the decentralized solution of Goyal’s Problem is less than
the buyer’s optimum order quantity in the counterpart centralized solution, i.e., Qc > Q

d.
Proof. All proofs are presented in the Appendix. h
Proposition 1 implies that when cargo cost and capacity are ignored, the vendor should always encourage
the buyer to order more to coordinate the channel.
Proposition 2. The optimum value of n in the decentralized solution of Goyal’s Problem is greater than, or equal
to, the optimum value of n in the counterpart centralized solution, i.e., nd P n

c .
Proposition 2 indicates that when cargo cost and capacity are ignored, the decentralized solution results in
more frequent dispatches to the buyer during the vendor’s replenishment cycle than does the centralized
solution.
The results presented in Propositions 1 and 2 can be interpreted as follows. The buyer prefers smaller, and,
hence, more frequent replenishments in the decentralized setting, probably because inventory holding at the
buyer is costly, i.e., hr > hw. Examining Expression (8) and using its similarity to the average annual cost func-
tion under the classical EOQ model, we can interpret (Kw/n) + Kr and nhw + h
0 as the ‘‘setup’’ and ‘‘per unit
per unit time holding’’ costs of the centralized decision maker, respectively. The centralized decision maker
prefers less frequent buyer replenishments, i.e., nc 6 nd, and, hence, we have ðKw=ncÞ þ Kr P ðKw=ndÞ þ Kr
and nchw þ h0 6 ndhw þ h0. This implies that the ‘‘setup’’ cost is larger whereas the ‘‘holding’’ cost is smaller
for the centralized decision maker so that a larger order quantity is preferable under nc . That is, the discrep-
ancy between the preferable order frequencies of the centralized decision maker and the buyer, and the impact
of this discrepancy on the ‘‘setup’’ and holding’’ costs of the centralized decision maker lead to Qc > Q

d.
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speciﬁcally, when the stepwise transportation costs are considered explicitly, it may be more cost eﬀective to
replenish the buyer in full cargoes so that Qc is an integer multiple of P whereas Q

d is not so that Q

c < Q

d, i.e.,
a full-truck-load (FTL) shipment may be preferable to a larger order quantity that constitutes a less-than-
truck-load (LTL) shipment. This is simply due to the fact that the underlying cost functions are discontinuous
under the general replenishment cost functions.
Based on Proposition 1, the channel coordination mechanism, i.e., the coordinated solution, outlined below
in Proposition 3 builds on the idea of wholesale price discounts that discourage the buyer from ordering small
quantities. More speciﬁcally, under this coordinated solution, the buyer is motivated to order the centralized
order quantity Qc without exceeding the cost of his/her decentralized solution.
Proposition 3. Considering Goyal’s Problem, letD ¼ GrðQ

cÞ  GrðQdÞ
D
:Under a unit discount of D offered by the vendor for order sizes greater than or equal to Qc , ordering Q

c units
minimizes the buyer’s average annual cost. Under this new pricing scheme, the buyer’s average annual cost does
not exceed GrðQdÞ, the vendor’s average annual profit is improved relative to the decentralized setting, and D < c.
We note that the eﬃciency of similar coordination mechanisms has been investigated in the literature for
Goyal’s Problem, e.g., see [9,11], and its variants, e.g., the case where the inventory holding costs are ignored
[10], the case where the vendor’s production rate is ﬁnite [1], the case of price sensitive demand [15], and the
case where information asymmetry considerations are taken into account [3]. With the exception of the results
in [9], the previous work concentrates on lot-for-lot replenishment policies for the buyer–vendor pair, i.e., the
case where n = 1, ignoring the impact of the vendor’s replenishment decisions on coordination, whereas, here,
we consider n as a decision variable. As we demonstrate in the following development, this consideration is
particularly important for an analytical quantiﬁcation of the value of coordination. We also note that the
coordination mechanism in Proposition 3 is presented here for the sake of completeness, i.e., for comparing
the coordination issues in Goyal’s Problem with those in Problems I and II. More speciﬁcally, as we show later
in the paper, Proposition 1 does not hold for Problems I and II for which some nontraditional observations
are reported in Section 4. As a result, when cargo cost and capacity are considered explicitly, in some cases
smaller orders from the buyer are more desirable for the vendor, and, unlike under the mechanism in Prop-
osition 3, we need to discourage the buyer from ordering more.
Next, utilizing the results about the decentralized and coordinated solutions for Goyal’s Problem, we pro-
vide an in-depth analysis of our main focus: the improvement rate due to coordination. Recalling Expression
(5), we haveIR ¼ 1 GrðQ

cÞ þ GwðQc ; ncÞ
GrðQdÞ þ GwðQd; ndÞ
 
 100%: ð13ÞWe begin our analysis with Proposition 4 which provides an analytical expression of IR in terms of the crit-
ical model parameters and optimal n values under the decentralized and centralized solutions of Goyal’s Prob-
lem. In Corollary 1, we present a simpliﬁed closed form expression of IR over a certain parameter range that
can be characterized analytically.
Proposition 4. For Goyal’s Problem, the improvement rate due to coordination is given byIR ¼ 1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 1nc
Kw
Kr
 
ðnc  1Þ hwhr þ 1
 r
2þ 1n
d
Kw
Kr
þ ðnd  1Þ hwhr
 
0
BB@
1
CCA 100%: ð14Þ
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Krhw
6 2 then IR ¼ 1
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ KwKr
q
2þ KwKr
0
@
1
A 100%:It is important to note that under the conditions of Corollary 1, the lot-for-lot policy is, in fact, optimal
under both decentralized and centralized control, i.e., nd ¼ nc ¼ 1 (see the proof of Corollary 1 in the Appen-
dix.) Hence, for those problem instances where the lot-for-lot policy is optimal under both decentralized and
centralized control, the resulting IR value does not depend on the holding costs, hw and hr, or the demand rate
D. In fact, for all parameter settings, we can easily prove that IR depends only on the ratios Kw/Kr and hr/hw
and that it does not depend on D because all of the demand has to be satisﬁed. The following lemma provides
a foundation for this proof.
Lemma 1. For a given ðKwKr ;
hw
hr
Þ pair, the corresponding KwhrKrhw ;
Kwh0
Krhw
 
pair is unique and can be obtained using the
transformationf ½ðx; yÞ ¼ ðf1½ðx; yÞ; f2½ðx; yÞÞ; where
f1½ðx; yÞ ¼ x=y; and
f2½ðx; yÞ ¼ ðx=yÞ  x:Similarly, for a given KwhrKrhw ;
Kwh0
Krhw
 
pair, the corresponding KwKr ;
hw
hr
 
pair is unique and can be obtained using the
transformationg½ðx; yÞ ¼ ðg1½ðx; yÞ; g2½ðx; yÞÞ; where
g1½ðx; yÞ ¼ x y; and
g2½ðx; yÞ ¼ ðx yÞ=x:The above lemma implies that knowing the ratios Kw/Kr and hr/hw is suﬃcient for calculating the corre-
sponding unique values of KwhrKrhw and
Kwh0
Krhw
, and vice versa. Recalling Inequalities (9) and (11), we know that
the optimum n value under the decentralized and centralized models of Goyal’s Problem are speciﬁed by
Kwhr
Krhw
and Kwh
0
Krhw
values. Therefore, for both models, vendors of two diﬀerent systems having the same Kw/Kr
and hr/hw ratios send an equal number of buyer replenishments during one replenishment cycle. Hence, we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Goyal’s model, the improvement rates in different systems with the same
Kw/Kr and hr/hw ratios are equal.
Using the formal results we have developed so far, we proceed to provide numerical lower and upper
bounds on the improvement rate.
Proposition 5. For Goyal’s problem,
• If 0 < KwhrKrhw 6 2, then 0 < IR < 1
ﬃﬃ
3
p
2
 
 100%. Furthermore, if Kw/Kr > 1, then 1 2
ﬃﬃ
2
p
3
 
 100% <
IR < 1
ﬃﬃ
3
p
2
 
 100%.
• If KwhrKrhw > 2 and
Kwh0
Krhw
P 2, then 0 < IR 6 ð1
3
Þ  100%. Furthermore, if Kw/Kr > 1, then 0 < IR <
1 2
ﬃﬃ
3
p
5
 
 100%.
• When KwhrKrhw > 2 and
Kwh0
Krhw
< 2, the value of coordination can be very high such that the improvement rate IR is
almost 100%.Proposition 5 provides important practical results characterizing the improvement rate IR. That is, by
simply computing the KwhrKrhw and
Kwh0
Krhw
ratios, we can obtain immediate numerical bounds quantifying the value
of coordination without computing the corresponding decentralized, centralized, and coordinated solutions.
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instance, if the condition of Corollary 1 is satisﬁed, then the exact value of IR can also be computed without
computing the corresponding decentralized, centralized, and coordinated solutions. For other problem
instances, e.g., where the condition of the second or the third item in Proposition 5 is satisﬁed, then the exact
value of coordination should be computed numerically. Hence, we report detailed numerical results later in
Section 5. Next, in Section 4, we extend the problem setting by analyzing Problems I and II.
4. Analysis of Problems I and II: Generalized replenishment cost problems
As we have noted earlier, by studying the decentralized models for Problems I and II and developing eﬀec-
tive channel coordination mechanisms, we extend [13] where the counterpart centralized solutions for these
two problems were ﬁrst developed. According to the results in [13], obtaining the centralized solutions for
Problems I and II is a challenging task. As we show in this section, a comparison of the centralized and decen-
tralized solutions for Problem I and II reveals important analytical properties of the coordinated solutions and
these properties oﬀer new insights.
Before proceeding with a detailed analysis, we examine the properties of a speciﬁc function denoted by w(n)
and given bywðnÞ ¼ KD
nQ
þ nQ=Pd eRD
nQ
þ hðn 1ÞQ
2
: ð15ÞObserve that w(n) is a piecewise function, and, in turn, it is not diﬀerentiable. Computing the minimizer of this
function for ﬁxed and positive values of K, R, P, h and Q is important for our purposes. Letnmin ¼ max 1; B
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
B2  2KDh
p
hQ
$ % !
; and
nmax ¼ Bþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
B2  2KDh
p
hQ
& ’
; where
B ¼ ðK þ RÞD
Q
þ hQ
2
:Also, let n* denote the minimizer of w(n). The following proposition presents lower and upper bounds for n*.
Proposition 6. nmin 6 n* 6 nmax.
Next, recalling the formulations in Table 2 and using Proposition 6, we present the decentralized and coor-
dinated solutions for Problems I and II.
4.1. Decentralized and coordinated solutions for Problem I
In Problem I, the buyer’s individual cost is still given by Expression (6), and hence, his/her optimal decen-
tralized order quantity is Qd ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KrD=hr
p
. Along with the usual set-up and holding costs, now the vendor also
incurs a cost of $R for each cargo with capacity P so the vendor’s cost function is givenGwðQr; nÞ ¼
ðKw þ dnQr=PeRÞD
nQr
þ hwðn 1ÞQr
2
: ð16ÞConsequently, given Qd, the vendor’s subproblem in the Decentralized Model I is to ﬁnd the optimal num-
ber of buyer replenishments within one vendor replenishment cycle, i.e., the optimum value of n that mini-
mizes GwðQd; nÞ where Gw(Æ, Æ) is given by Expression (16). Observe that GwðQd; nÞ has the same form as
w(n) given by Expression (15) so that its minimizer can be computed using a ﬁnite enumeration algorithm
based on Proposition 6. Letting K = Kw, Q ¼ Qd and h = hw and using the result in Proposition 6, the mini-
mizer nd of GwðQd; nÞ is then given by argminfGwðQd; nÞ : n ¼ nmin; . . . ; nmaxg. As a result, the decentralized
solution of Problem I is speciﬁed by ðQd; ndÞ.
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Qd > Q

c and Q

d < Q

c . This is simply because, unlike in Goyal’s Problem, there are problem instances where
Qd > Q

c . Hence, instead of the coordination mechanism in Proposition 3 that discourages the buyer from
ordering small quantities, a more sophisticated mechanism is needed. The proposed coordination mechanism
for Problem I is presented in Proposition 7, and, when appropriate, this mechanism discourages the buyer
from ordering large quantities. This nontraditional result is due to cargo cost and capacity considerations
under which smaller orders from the buyer may be more desirable for eﬃcient cargo space utilization.
Proposition 7. Considering Problem I, letD ¼ GrðQ

cÞ  GrðQdÞ
D
:• If Qd < Q

c , under a unit discount of D offered by the vendor for order sizes greater than, or equal to, Q

c ,
ordering Qc minimizes the buyer’s average annual cost. Under this new pricing scheme, the buyer’s average
annual cost does not exceed GrðQdÞ, the vendor’s average annual proﬁt is improved relative to the decen-
tralized setting, and D < c.
• If Qd > Q

c , under a unit discount of D offered by the vendor for order sizes less than, or equal to, Q

c , order-
ing Qc minimizes the buyer’s average annual cost. Under this new pricing scheme, the buyer’s average
annual cost does not exceed GrðQdÞ, the vendor’s average annual proﬁt is improved relative to the decen-
tralized setting, and D < c.
For the case Qd < Q

c , since the discount is valid on all items for order sizes greater than, or equal to, Q

c , we
call the corresponding price schedule all-units quantity pricing with economies of scale.When Qd < Q

c , since the
discount is valid on all items for order sizes less than, or equal to, Qc , we call the corresponding price schedule
all-units quantity pricing with diseconomies of scale.
We note that the coordination mechanism proposed above can also be used for Goyal’s Problem. Recall
that the only diﬀerence between Goyal’s Problem and the case considered in Problem I is the consideration
of cargo cost and capacity associated with vendor’s replenishments. As stated in Proposition 1, without this
consideration, the optimal order quantity in the centralized solution is always greater than, or equal to, the
optimal order quantity in the decentralized solution. Therefore, to coordinate the system without cargo cost
and capacity, we do not need to consider the second item in Proposition 7, in which case Proposition 7 reduces
to Proposition 3.
For general parameter settings, closed form expressions and analytical bounds representing the improve-
ment rates due to channel coordination cannot be obtained for either Problem I or Problem II; however, a
detailed numerical study follows in Section 5. Also, if the cargo capacity is suﬃciently large so that inbound
replenishments do not require more than one truck (i.e., for P!1, we have dQ/Pe = 1, "0 < Q <1), then
Proposition 5 can be used for computing lower and upper bounds on the improvement rate by substituting
Kw + R for Kw.
4.2. Decentralized and coordinated solutions for problem II
In Problem II, along with the usual set-up and holding costs, both the buyer and the vendor incur a cost of
$R for each cargo with capacity P. The buyer’s individual cost is given byGrðQrÞ ¼
DKr
Qr
þ hrQr
2
þ D Qr=Pd eR
Qr
ð17Þand his/her optimal decentralized order quantity, i.e., Qd, is the minimizer associated with this cost function.
An algorithmic approach for computing Qd is presented in [13] (see Algorithm 1 on p. 991 in [13]), and, hence,
the details are omitted here. Consequently, given Qd, the vendor’s subproblem in the Decentralized Model II
is, again, to ﬁnd the optimal number of buyer replenishments within one vendor replenishment cycle, i.e., the
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Q ¼ Qd and h = hw and using the result in Proposition 6, the minimizer nd of GwðQd; nÞ is
nd ¼ argminfGwðQd; nÞ : n ¼ nmin; . . . ; nmaxg, and the decentralized solution of Problem II is ðQd; ndÞ.
As for Problem I, in order to develop an eﬀective coordination mechanism for Problem II, we need to con-
sider two cases: Qd > Q

c and Q

d < Q

c . However, unlike the coordination mechanism in Proposition 7, the idea
of wholesale pricing, with or without economies of scale, does not work in this case due to the additional dif-
ﬁculties for the buyer that are associated with cargo cost and capacity considerations. The proposed coordi-
nation mechanism for Problem II is presented in Proposition 8, and, when appropriate, this mechanism
discourages the buyer from ordering large quantities using side payments. Again, this nontraditional result
is due to cargo cost and capacity considerations under which smaller or larger orders from the buyer may
be more desirable for eﬃcient cargo space utilization.
Proposition 8. Considering Problem II, letl1 ¼ Q

c
P
	 

;
l2 ¼ Q

c
P
 
; and
Ql2 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ðKr þ l2RÞD
hr
s
;so that Ql2 is the economic order quantity when l2 trucks are used and l2 is the number of trucks needed for ship-
ping Qc units. Under the following coordination mechanism, ordering Q

c units minimizes the buyer’s average an-
nual cost in such a way that it does not exceed GrðQdÞ whereas the vendor’s average annual profit is improved
relative to the decentralized setting.
• If Qd < Q

c :
– If Qc P Ql2 , a fixed payment of GrðQcÞ  GrðQdÞ is paid by the vendor to the buyer for order sizes larger
than or equal to Qc .
– If Qc < Ql2 , a fixed payment of GrðQcÞ  GrðQdÞ is paid by the vendor to the buyer for order sizes in the
range ðl1P ;Qc .
• If Qd > Q

c , a fixed payment of GrðQcÞ  GrðQdÞ is paid by the vendor to the buyer for order sizes in the range
ðl1P ;Qc .
Under the coordination mechanism described in Proposition 8, the vendor pays ﬁxed rewards to the buyer,
which is called a vendor-managed incentive scheme with ﬁxed rewards to the buyer.
Finally, we note that if the cargo capacity is suﬃciently large so that inbound and outbound replenishments
do not require more than one truck, then Proposition 5 can be used for computing lower and upper bounds on
the improvement rate by substituting Kw + R for Kw, and Kr + R for Kr.
5. Numerical results
Our numerical results are based on two data sets; namely, Data Sets 1 and 2. Since the current paper is an
extension of [13], Data Set 1 includes the problem instances provided therein. That is, in Data Set 1, we have
Kw = 175, 350, 700; Kr = 50, 100, 150; R = 60, 120, 240; P = 5, 10, 20; D = 2, 4, 8; hw = 0.5, 1, 2; and hr = 4, 8,
16. Hence, Data Set 1 includes 37 = 2187 problem instances. Data Set 2 includes 40,000 problem instances. In
generating this new data set, we have focused on having a variety of values for the ratios KwhrKrhw and
Kwh0
Krhw
, and
cargo cost parameters P and R. More speciﬁcally, for ﬁxed values of D, Kr and hw (i.e., D = 10, Kr = 160,
hw = 10), we have generated diﬀerent Kw/Kr and h
0/hw ratios over [1.01,3), and [0.01,2), respectively, using
a step size of 0.1. Also, in this larger data set, we have considered ten diﬀerent cargo cost values, starting
at 2.5 and increasing to 1280 by multiples of 2. Similarly, we have considered ten diﬀerent cargo capacity val-
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discussion are based on Data Set 2; however, the same comments apply to Data Set 1 as well. Also, for illus-
trative purposes, we refer to some problem instances from Data Set 1, along with a couple of additional exam-
ples that do not belong to either of the data sets.
All three problem settings discussed in the paper (i.e., Goyal’s Problem, Problem I, and Problem II) have
been analyzed using both data sets. In examining our numerical results, we pay speciﬁc attention to the param-
eter ranges characterized in Proposition 5 for Goyal’s Problem. These parameter ranges are:
Range 1: 0 < KwhrKrhw 6 2,
Range 2: KwhrKrhw > 2 and
Kwh0
Krhw
P 2, and
Range 3: KwhrKrhw > 2 and
Kwh0
Krhw
< 2.
For each problem setting, the average, maximum, and minimum improvement rates over Ranges 1–3 are
reported in Table 3.
We proceed with a discussion of important observations based on our numerical results. As expected, our
numerical results indicate that, for Goyal’s Problem,
• Maximum IR over Range 3 > Maximum IR over Range 1, and
• Maximum IR over Range 1 > Maximum IR over Range 2.
On the other hand, according to Table 3, for Problems I and II,
• Maximum IR over Range 1 > Maximum IR over Range 3, and
• Maximum IR over Range 3 > Maximum IR over Range 2.
Also, for Goyal’s Problem, the maximum and minimum IR values in Table 3 provide a strong indication
that the theoretical bounds of IR over Range 1 (given by Proposition 5) are fairly tight for Data Set 2. How-
ever, the corresponding upper bound over Range 2 is not tight for Data Set 2.Table 3
Average, maximum, and minimum IR values for diﬀerent ranges of the Data Set 2
Range Goyal’s Problem Problem I Problem II
Average IR values
1 7.951 6.939 4.337
2 1.592 2.136 1.088
3 5.198 4.416 3.216
Maximum IR values
1 12.743 23.454 15.467
2 2.979 13.130 9.688
3 13.147 21.055 13.938
Minimum IR values
1 5.798 0.107 0
2 0.234 0.012 0
3 0.448 0.012 0
Table 4
Tightness of the bounds in Proposition 5
E.g. Kw Kr hr hw D IR (%)
1 100 50.051 1 0.999 "D 13.383
2 100 99.98 1 0.8 "D 5.721
3 180 10 1 0.9 "D 5.243
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problem instances of the two data sets and are included as additional numerical evidence for our discussion
of the tightness of the theoretical bounds of IR presented in Proposition 5. The ﬁrst and second examples in
Table 4 demonstrate that the theoretical upper and lower bounds over Region I are, in fact, tight. The third
example in Table 4 corresponds to the problem instance representing the maximum IR value we have
observed over Region II after extensive numerical experimentation with several problem instances including
those in Data Sets 1 and 2. That is, although we have constructed a numerical example demonstrating thatIR
could be as high as 100% (see Proposition 5), we have not observed such an extreme case in our numerical
study. In fact, according to Table 3, for all three problems considered in the paper, we have:
• Average IR over Range 1 > Average IR over Range 3, and
• Average IR over Range 3 > Average IR over Range 2.
Examining the maximum IR values in Table 3, we further conclude that maximum potential savings are
particularly signiﬁcant for Problems I and II. For example, the maximum IR values over Range I can be as
high as 23.454% and 15.467% for Problems I and II, respectively, both of which exceed the 13.397% upper
bound over this range for Goyal’s Problem. On the other hand, the 5.719% lower bound of Goyal’s Problem
does not apply to Problems I and II, as the minimum IR values over Range I can be as small as 0% for these
problems. Table 5 illustrates the speciﬁc problem instances corresponding to the maximum savings reported in
Table 3 and obtained in Data Set 1.
In fact, regardless of the parameter range, i.e., Ranges 1, 2, or 3, the maximum potential impact of coor-
dination is substantial for Problems I and II, varying between approximately 9% and 23%. Our numerical
results also indicate that, although substantial savings might be achievable, they are not guaranteed in all
cases. Hence, a careful analysis building on the techniques presented in the paper should be undertaken for
all practical purposes.
Tables 6 and 7 illustrate the dependence of IR on P and R for Problem I and II, respectively, and reveal
some interesting observations as discussed in the remainder of this section.
For any given P value, as R approaches 0, the impact of both R and P on IR diminishes. That is, for
R = 0, the corresponding IR values remain constant for all P over Ranges 1, 2, and 3, for both Problems
I and II. Secondly, considering Problem I, for any given R value, as P approaches 512, the impact of P on
IR diminishes. That is, for any given R value, there exists a threshold P value after which the corresponding
IR values remain constant. For example, in Table 6, over Range 1, the threshold P value is between 64 and
128 for R 6 80, and it is between 128 and 256 for RP 160. In fact, for Problem I, over all three ranges, if
PP 256 then the corresponding IR values are constant for all R. The results in Table 7 indicate that similar
observations are also true for Problem II as well.Table 5
Examples illustrating high IR values
E.g. # Problem Kw Kr hr hw D P R IR (%)
Examples from Data Set 1
1 Goyal 175 150 4 2 "D – – 4.522
2 I 175 50 4 2 2 20 240 12.947
3 II 175 50 4 2 2 20 120 10.844
Examples from Data Set 2
4 Goyal 465.6 160 20.1 10 "D – – 2.979
5 Goyal 305.6 160 10.1 10 "D – – 12.743
6 Goyal 321.6 160 10.1 10 "D – – 13.147
7 I 177.6 160 1.455 0.5 10 128 1280 13.130
8 I 321.6 160 0.505 0.5 10 128 320 21.055
9 I 161.6 160 0.505 0.5 10 128 640 23.454
10 II 353.6 160 0.955 0.5 10 128 160 9.688
11 II 321.6 160 0.505 0.5 10 64 20 13.938
12 II 209.6 160 0.505 0.5 10 64 20 15.467
Table 6
The impact of P and R on IR: Problem I
P R=0 R = 2.5 R = 5 R = 10 R = 20 R = 40 R = 80 R = 160 R = 320 R = 640 Avg IR
Range 1: 1 6 KwhrKrhw ¼ 1:0121 6 2;Kr ¼ 160;Kw ¼ 161:6; hr ¼ 10:1; hw ¼ 10; h
0 ¼ 0:1;D ¼ 10
2 5.798 4.884 4.240 3.391 2.487 1.722 1.189 0.867 0.688 0.594 2.586
4 5.798 5.297 4.884 4.240 3.391 2.487 1.722 1.189 0.867 0.688 3.056
8 5.798 5.533 5.297 4.884 4.240 3.391 2.487 1.722 1.189 0.867 3.541
16 5.798 5.661 5.533 5.297 4.884 4.240 3.391 2.487 1.722 1.189 4.020
32 5.798 5.811 5.845 5.968 6.393 7.450 9.051 10.834 7.792 5.089 7.003
64 5.798 6.044 6.290 6.784 7.771 9.727 13.220 17.884 17.698 17.503 10.872
128 5.798 5.921 6.044 6.290 6.784 7.771 9.727 13.220 18.128 23.454 10.314
256 5.798 5.921 6.044 6.290 6.784 7.771 9.727 13.147 10.903 10.774 8.316
512 5.798 5.921 6.044 6.290 6.784 7.771 9.727 13.147 10.903 10.774 8.316
Avg IR 5.798 5.524 5.361 5.192 5.124 5.352 6.111 7.519 7.048 7.147 6.018
Range 2: KwhrKrhw ¼ 5:8491 > 2;
Kwh
0
Krhw
¼ 3:8391P 2;Kr ¼ 160;Kw ¼ 321:6; hr ¼ 29:1; hw ¼ 10; h0 ¼ 19:1;D ¼ 10
R = 2.5
2 1.970 1.796 1.654 1.435 1.151 0.854 0.607 0.438 0.336 0.280 1.052
4 1.970 1.980 1.996 2.024 2.066 2.121 2.178 1.808 1.117 0.700 1.796
8 1.970 1.954 1.963 1.980 2.009 2.054 2.112 2.172 2.221 2.255 2.069
16 1.970 1.949 1.954 1.963 1.980 2.009 2.054 2.112 2.172 2.221 2.038
32 1.970 1.895 1.828 1.712 1.550 1.461 1.538 1.655 1.807 1.965 1.738
64 1.970 2.046 2.122 2.277 2.596 3.260 4.662 5.785 5.266 4.584 3.457
128 1.970 2.008 2.046 2.122 2.277 2.596 3.260 4.662 7.198 10.849 3.899
256 1.970 2.008 2.046 2.071 1.927 1.661 1.210 0.579 1.311 0.689 1.547
512 1.970 2.008 2.046 2.071 1.927 1.661 1.210 0.579 1.311 0.689 1.547
Avg IR 1.970 1.930 1.909 1.881 1.834 1.829 1.927 2.013 2.302 2.448 2.004
Range 3: KwhrKrhw ¼ 2:0301 > 2; Kwh
0
Krhw
¼ 0:0201 < 2;Kr ¼ 160;Kw ¼ 321:6; hr ¼ 10:1; hw ¼ 10; h0 ¼ 0:1;D ¼ 10
R = 2.5
2 13.147 11.435 10.132 8.278 6.115 4.108 2.603 1.645 1.098 0.804 5.937
4 13.147 12.222 11.429 10.126 8.273 6.111 4.105 2.601 1.644 1.098 7.076
8 13.147 12.661 12.220 11.427 10.124 8.271 6.110 4.105 2.601 1.644 8.231
16 13.147 12.845 12.598 12.159 11.370 10.074 8.231 6.081 4.086 2.590 9.318
32 13.147 12.879 12.658 12.429 11.996 11.219 9.941 8.123 6.003 4.036 10.243
64 13.147 12.984 12.944 12.992 13.084 13.255 13.557 14.038 14.690 15.310 13.600
128 13.147 13.037 13.089 13.280 13.652 14.363 15.667 17.884 21.055 18.442 15.362
256 13.147 13.092 13.037 12.931 12.727 12.354 11.734 10.903 10.380 11.502 12.181
512 13.147 13.092 13.037 12.931 12.727 12.354 11.734 10.903 10.380 11.502 12.181
Avg IR 13.147 12.438 11.942 11.267 10.418 9.471 8.533 7.738 7.273 6.737 9.896
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Goyal’s Problem. That is, once these threshold values are reached, the truck capacity is suﬃciently large so
that IR does not depend on the capacity at all. In order to illustrate how this observation enables us to
use our analytical results on Goyal’s Problem, let us consider a speciﬁc instance of Problem II in Table 7,
i.e., the problem instance where R = 2.5 and the other model parameters are in Range 3 so that the corre-
sponding IR value remains constant at 13.203% over PP 256. As we have noted at the end of Section
4.2, when the truck capacity is suﬃciently large, we can use Proposition 4 to compute IR by adding the
per truck cost R to ﬁxed replenishment costs, i.e., by substituting Kw = 312.6 + 2.5 = 324.1 and
Kr = 160 + 2.5 = 162.5 in Expression (14). It follows from Expressions (9) and (11) that nd ¼ 2 and nc ¼ 1,
and hence, Expression (14) leads to IR ¼ 13:203%, which is the same as our experimental result in Table 7.
For Problem I, over Range 1, considering a ﬁxed value of P such that P 6 16, we observe that as R
increases, IR decreases (see Table 6.) However, this is no longer true for ﬁxed values of P such that
PP 32. In fact, there exist threshold values of P up to which, as R increases, IR decreases, not only for
Range 1 but also for Ranges 2 and 3 for both Problems I and II. For Problem 2, over Range 1, considering
Table 7
The impact of P and R on IR: Problem II
P R = 0 R = 2.5 R = 5 R = 10 R = 20 R = 40 R = 80 R = 160 R = 320 R = 640 Avg IR
Range 1: 1 6 KwhrKrhw ¼ 1:0121 6 2;Kr ¼ 160;Kw ¼ 161:6; hr ¼ 10:1; hw ¼ 10; h0 ¼ 0:1;D ¼ 10
2 5.798 3.988 3.085 2.123 1.308 0.740 0.396 0.205 0.104 0.053 1.780
4 5.798 4.672 3.988 3.085 2.123 1.308 0.740 0.396 0.205 0.104 2.242
8 5.798 5.110 4.672 3.988 3.085 2.123 1.308 0.740 0.396 0.205 2.743
16 5.798 5.361 5.110 4.672 3.988 3.085 2.123 1.308 0.740 0.396 3.258
32 5.798 5.097 4.461 3.348 1.317 0.357 0.274 0.187 0.114 0.064 2.102
64 5.798 5.795 5.793 5.789 12.348 11.361 9.807 7.701 5.387 3.365 7.314
128 5.798 5.796 5.795 5.793 5.789 5.782 5.499 3.481 0.000 0.000 4.373
256 5.798 5.796 5.795 5.793 5.789 5.782 5.771 5.758 5.745 5.735 5.776
512 5.798 5.796 5.795 5.793 5.789 5.782 5.771 5.758 5.745 5.735 5.776
Avg IR 5.798 5.050 4.662 4.169 4.228 3.672 3.189 2.564 1.849 1.568 3.675
Range 2: KwhrKrhw ¼ 5:8491 > 2;
Kwh0
Krhw
¼ 3:8391P 2;Kr ¼ 160;Kw ¼ 321:6; hr ¼ 29:1; hw ¼ 10; h0 ¼ 19:1;D ¼ 10
R = 0
2 1.970 1.825 1.548 1.187 0.810 0.495 0.278 0.149 0.077 0.039 0.838
4 1.970 1.368 1.245 1.055 0.808 0.551 0.336 0.189 0.101 0.052 0.768
8 1.970 1.440 1.368 1.245 1.055 0.808 0.551 0.336 0.189 0.101 0.906
16 1.970 1.294 1.068 0.846 0.770 0.652 0.500 0.341 0.208 0.117 0.777
32 1.970 1.747 1.968 1.967 1.965 1.551 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.117
64 1.970 1.969 1.969 1.968 1.967 1.965 1.551 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.336
128 1.970 1.932 1.896 1.828 1.704 1.500 1.095 6.977 8.375 5.540 3.282
256 1.970 1.932 1.896 1.828 1.704 1.500 1.209 0.876 0.583 0.383 1.388
512 1.970 1.932 1.896 1.828 1.704 1.500 1.209 0.876 0.583 0.383 1.388
Avg IR 1.970 1.678 1.588 1.445 1.292 1.076 0.686 0.981 1.015 0.663 1.239
Range 3: KwhrKrhw ¼ 2:0301 > 2;
Kwh0
Krhw
¼ 0:0201 < 2;Kr ¼ 160;Kw ¼ 321:6; hr ¼ 10:1; hw ¼ 10; h0 ¼ 0:1;D ¼ 10
R = 2.5
2 13.147 10.025 8.102 5.855 3.766 2.198 1.199 0.628 0.322 0.163 4.541
4 13.147 11.369 10.019 8.097 5.851 3.764 2.197 1.198 0.628 0.322 5.659
8 13.147 12.187 11.367 10.017 8.095 5.850 3.763 2.196 1.198 0.628 6.845
16 13.147 12.581 12.127 11.310 9.967 8.055 5.821 3.744 2.185 1.192 8.013
32 13.147 12.301 11.402 9.656 6.333 4.488 3.586 2.558 1.626 0.940 6.604
64 13.147 12.925 12.636 12.066 13.938 13.019 11.502 9.328 6.770 4.371 10.970
128 13.147 13.072 12.925 12.636 12.066 10.960 8.827 4.703 0.000 0.000 8.834
256 13.147 13.203 13.248 13.039 12.654 11.990 10.978 9.688 8.375 7.268 11.359
512 13.147 13.203 13.248 13.039 12.654 11.990 10.978 9.688 8.375 7.313 11.364
Avg IR 13.147 11.897 11.093 9.948 8.752 7.351 5.948 4.405 2.964 2.228 7.773
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A. Toptal, S. C¸etinkaya / European Journal of Operational Research 187 (2008) 785–805 799a ﬁxed value of R such that R 6 10, we observe that as P increases, IR increases, i.e., does not decrease (see
Table 7.) However, this is no longer true for ﬁxed values of R such that RP 20. In fact, there exist threshold
values of R up to which, as P increases, IR increases, not only for Range 1 but also for Ranges 2 and 3 for
both Problems I and II.
We note that some of the most signiﬁcant IR values in Tables 6 and 7 are observed after the threshold P
and R values2 mentioned above are exceeded. Finally, we also note that the impact of P and R on IR is dif-
ﬁcult to characterize in general, especially once these threshold values are exceeded.6. Conclusions and future research
Our results demonstrate that signiﬁcant cost savings can be achieved through coordination; however, these
savings are not guaranteed in general, i.e., for all parameter settings, and, hence, for all practical purposes.
These results provide simple practical rules characterizing the cost improvement rates for diﬀerent parameter
settings for problems with and without explicit transportation considerations, and such rules are useful for
managers to use as practical guidelines in preliminary analysis. Overall, we conclude that although the poten-
tial maximum savings are more signiﬁcant under explicit transportation considerations, i.e., for Problems I
and II, it is diﬃcult to predict the actual savings without a careful investigation. Hence, for these problems,
there is a need to use the technical development in Section 4 to compare the centralized and decentralized solu-
tions for the parameter set of interest. Also, the decentralized analysis provided in this paper for the models
with transportation considerations is important for the following additional reason. Classical methods pro-
posed in the literature for achieving channel coordination assume that it is always to the vendor’s advantage
to inﬂuence the ordering behavior of the buyer in such a way that he/she orders more. For this reason, coor-
dination mechanisms such as quantity discounts, rebate policies, buyback policies, and ﬁxed payments aim to
increase the order quantity of the buyer. However, when the vendor’s proﬁt function is not an increasing func-
tion of the buyer’s order quantity, a larger order from the buyer can actually be disadvantageous to the ven-
dor. One such practical case is when the parties incur stepwise transportation costs as in this paper. Careful
investigation of other practical settings where similar nontraditional results apply and signiﬁcant cost savings
are achievable through coordination remains an area for future research.
It is also important to reiterate that our analytical and numerical results for Goyal’s problem indicate that
the value of coordination depends only on two important ratios that can be expressed in terms of the critical
cost parameters whereas it does not depend on the demand rate. However, these results do not hold under
general replenishment costs. In fact, when the demand is stochastic, the value of coordination would depend
on the demand process even under simpler replenishment cost structures. A careful investigation of the value
of coordination under stochastic demand with or without stepwise transportation costs remains another
area for future investigation. Additional important avenues for future research include quantifying the value
of coordination under information asymmetry considerations and in multi-buyer and/or multi-vendor
settings.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that Qc 6 Qd. Then, using Expressions (10) and (12), it is easy to show that2 ThKrhr þ Kwhrnc
6 ncKrhw þ Krh0:Substituting h 0 = hr  hw in the above inequality, and rearranging the terms we havencðnc  1ÞP
Kwhr
Krhw
:ese threshold values are indicated by bold characters for each of the regions illustrated in Tables 6 and 7 for Problems I and II.
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0, the above inequality implies that ncðnc  1Þ > Kwh
0
Krhw
. This contradicts Expression (11), and, hence,
Qc > Q

d. h
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that nd < n

c . Then, since n

d and n

c are both positive integers, ðnc  ndÞP 1.
Multiplying both sides of this inequality by nc þ nd, we obtain ðncÞ2  ðndÞ2 P nc þ nd which, in turn, implies
that ncðnc  1ÞP ndðnd þ 1Þ. Using Expression (9), we also havendðnd þ 1Þ
Krhw
Kw
P hr;and, hence,ncðnc  1Þ
Krhw
Kw
P ndðnd þ 1Þ
Krhw
Kw
P hr:Noting that hr > h
0, by deﬁnition, the above inequality implies thatncðnc  1Þ >
Kwh
0
Krhw
;which, in turn, contradicts Expression (11). Therefore, nd P n

c . h
Proof of Proposition 3. Under the coordinated solution, the buyer’s cost is Gr(Q) for Q < Q

c and
Gr(Q)  D · D for QP Qc where Gr(Æ) is given by Expression (6). Since Qc > Qd and Qd is the minimizer of
Gr(Q), we have GrðQdÞ < GrðQÞ, 8Q < Qc and Q 6¼ Qd. For QP Qc , the cost function Gr(Q)  D · D is
increasing in Q, and, therefore, GrðQcÞ < GrðQÞ, 8Q > Qc . At order quantity Qc , the buyer’s cost is given
by GrðQcÞ  D D ¼ GrðQdÞ so that the buyer stays in a no-worse situation under the coordinated solution
Also, under the coordinated solution, the vendor’s proﬁt isðc DÞD GwðQc ; ncÞ ¼ cD ðGrðQcÞ  GrðQdÞÞ  GwðQc ; ncÞ;
where Gw(Æ, Æ) is given by Expression (7). Since ðQc ; ncÞ is the minimizer of Gw(Q,n) + Gr(Qr), we have
GrðQcÞ  GrðQdÞ < GwðQd; ndÞ  GwðQc ; ncÞ; and it follows thatðc DÞD GwðQc ; ncÞ > cD GwðQd; ndÞ  GwðQc ; ncÞ
  GwðQc ; ncÞ > cD GwðQd; ndÞ:Consequently, the vendor’s proﬁt under the coordinated solution, given by ðc DÞD GwðQc ; ncÞ, is improved
relative to his/her proﬁt in the decentralized setting, i.e., cD GwðQd; ndÞ. Recall that we concentrate on the
case where the decentralized transactional setting makes economical sense for the vendor, i.e.,
cD GwðQd; ndÞ > 0. Then, ðc DÞD GwðQc ; ncÞ > 0 so that c > D. h
Proof of Proposition 4. Utilizing Expressions (10) and (12) in Expression (13), and performing algebraic
manipulations result in Expression (14). h
Proof of Corollary 1. It follows from Expression (9) that if0 6 Kwhr
Krhw
6 2; ð18Þthen nd ¼ 1. If nd ¼ 1, then Proposition 2 implies that nc ¼ 1. The result follows from substituting nd ¼ 1 and
nc ¼ 1 in Expression (14). h
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, f[(x,y)] is a relation from the set of possible KwKr ;
hw
hr
 
pairs to the set of ðKwhrKrhw ; Kwh
0
Krhw
Þ
pairs. The uniqueness of the output of this relation is based on the fact that f1[(x,y)] and f2[(x,y)] are real-val-
ued functions. The same argument can be extended for the second part of the lemma. h
Proof of Corollary 2. The corollary is a direct result of Expression (14), Lemma 1, and Inequalities (9) and
(11). h
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2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ KwKr
q
2þ KwKr
0
@
1
A 100%:Lettingx ¼ Kw
Kr
and f ðxÞ ¼ 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ xp
2þ x
for the ﬁrst part of the proposition it is suﬃcient to show thatf ðxÞ >
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
2
when 0 < x ¼ Kw
Kr
6 2;and thatﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
2
< f ðxÞ < 2
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
3
when we additionally have Kw=Kr > 1:Letting f 0(x) denote the ﬁrst derivative of f(x), we havef 0ðxÞ ¼ xﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ xp ðxþ 2Þ2 :Observe that f 0(x) < 0 for x > 0 so that f(x) is decreasing in x. Now, recall that hrhw > 1, and we consider the caseKwhr
Krhw
6 2. It follows that we are interested in f(x) where x ¼ KwKr < 2. Using the fact that f(x) is decreasing in x,
this implies f ðxÞ > limx!2f ðxÞ ¼
ﬃﬃ
3
p
2
, "x such that 0 < x 6 2. Similarly, when Kw/Kr > 1, we can easily show
that f ðxÞ < limx!1f ðxÞ ¼ 2
ﬃﬃ
2
p
3
.
Next, we consider the case KwhrKrhw > 2, and, similar to the proof of the ﬁrst part of the proposition, we show
thatGrðQcÞ þ GwðQc ; ncÞ
GrðQdÞ þ GwðQd; ndÞ
P
2
3
:Simultaneously, we also extend the proof to consider the case where we additionally have Kw/Kr > 1 in which
case it sufﬁces to showGrðQcÞ þ GwðQc ; ncÞ
GrðQdÞ þ GwðQd; ndÞ
>
2
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
5
;where Gw(Æ, Æ) and Gr(Æ) are given by Expressions (7) and (6), respectively.
Since, by deﬁnition, GrðQdÞ 6 GrðQcÞ and GwðQc ; ncÞ 6 GwðQd; ndÞ, we can writeGrðQcÞ þ GwðQc ; ncÞ
GrðQdÞ þ GwðQd; ndÞ
P
GrðQdÞ þ GwðQc ; ncÞ
GrðQdÞ þ GwðQd; ndÞ
P
GwðQc ; ncÞ
GwðQd; ndÞ
: ð19ÞFor a ﬁxed value of n, it is easy to show that Gw(Qr,n) is minimized atQr ðnÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KwD
nðn 1Þhw
s
:Therefore,Gw
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KwD
ncðnc  1Þhw
s
; nc
 !
6 GwðQc ; ncÞ; ð20Þ
802 A. Toptal, S. C¸etinkaya / European Journal of Operational Research 187 (2008) 785–805and combining Inequalities (19) and (20) leads toGrðQcÞ þ GwðQc ; ncÞ
GrðQdÞ þ GwðQd; ndÞ
P
Gw
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KwD
nc ðnc1Þhw
q
; nc
 
GwðQd; ndÞ
:Substituting in Qd ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KrD=hr
p
in the above expression and rearranging its terms, we haveGw
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KwD
nc ðnc1Þhw
q
; nc
 
GwðQd; ndÞ
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2Kwhwðnc1Þ
nc
q
Kw
n
d
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hr
2Kr
q
þ hwðnd1Þ
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2Kr
hr
q P 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðnc1Þ
nc
q
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
p
n
d
þ ndﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
p :
Since we now consider the case Kwh
0
Krhw
P 2, Expression (11) implies that nc P 2. Consequentlyﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
nc  1
nc
s
P
1ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p ;and we can writeGw
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KwD
nc ðnc1Þhw
q
; nc
 
GwðQd; ndÞ
P
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
p
n
d
þ ndﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
p : ð21Þ
In order to complete this part of the proof, we analyze the following two cases:
Case 1: nd 6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
q
6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ndðnd þ 1Þ
p
. In this case,ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
q
nd
þ n

dﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
q ð22Þ
reaches its maximum value atﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
s
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ndðnd þ 1Þ
q
:As a result,ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
q
nd
þ n

dﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
q 6 2nd þ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ndðnd þ 1Þ
p : ð23Þ
Using Inequalities (21) and (23), we conclude thatGw
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KwD
nc ðnc1Þhw
q
; nc
 
GwðQd; ndÞ
P
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ndðnd þ 1Þ
p
2nd þ 1
:Since we consider the case KwhrKrhw > 2, we know that n

d P 2, and, hence,GrðQcÞ þ GwðQc ; ncÞ
GrðQdÞ þ GwðQd; ndÞ
P
Gw
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KwD
nc ðnc1Þhw
q
; nc
 
GwðQd; ndÞ
P
2
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
5
:ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃKwhrq Case 2: ndðnd  1Þ 6 Krhw < nd. In this case, Expression (22) reaches its maximum atﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
s
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ndðnd  1Þ
q
;
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Kwhr
Krhw
q
nd
þ n

dﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
q 6 2nd  1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ndðnd  1Þ
p : ð24Þ
In order to complete the proof, we analyze Case 2 considering two possibilities. Namely, nd P 3 and n

d ¼ 2.d d d
and combining Inequalities (21) and (24) leads to
Case 2.1: n P 3. Considering n P 3, the right hand side of Inequality (24) reaches its maximum at n ¼ 3,Gw
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KwD
nc ðnc1Þhw
q
; nc
 
GwðQd; ndÞ
P
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ndðnd  1Þ
p
2nd  1
P
2
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
5
:Case 2.2: nd ¼ 2.
If we do not have the constraint that Kw/Kr > 1, under the general assumptions of Case 2, the proof of Case
2.2 is similar to that of Case 2.1, so using Inequalities (21) and (24) results inGw
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KwD
nc ðnc1Þhw
q
; nc
 
GwðQd; ndÞ
P
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ndðnd  1Þ
p
2nd  1
¼ 2
3
:If we additionally have Kw/Kr > 1, it follows from
Kwh0
Krhw
P 2 that KwhrKrhw > 3. Recalling the original assumptions
of Case 2 and using nd ¼ 2, we have
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
<
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
q
< 2. Then, utilizing Inequality (21), it sufﬁces to analyze
Expression (22). Observe that, within the parameter range of interest, this ratio reaches its maximum atﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
q
¼ ﬃﬃﬃ3p so that we can writeﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
q
nd
þ n

dﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Kwhr
Krhw
q
0
B@
1
CA < 7
2
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p :As a result, it follows from Inequality (21) thatGw
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KwD
nc ðnc1Þhw
q
; nc
 
GwðQd; ndÞ
>
2
ﬃﬃﬃ
6
p
7
:Combining our results for Case 2.1 and Case 2.2, we conclude that if KwhrKrhw > 2 and
Kwh0
Krhw
P 2, thenGrðQcÞ þ GwðQc ; ncÞ
GrðQdÞ þ GwðQd; ndÞ
P
2
3
;so that IR 6 1
3
  100%. Also, if we additionally have Kw/Kr > 1, then
GrðQcÞ þ GwðQc ; ncÞ
GrðQdÞ þ GwðQd; ndÞ
>
2
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
5
;and hence, IR < ð1 2
ﬃﬃ
3
p
5
Þ  100%. This completes the proof for the second part of the proposition.
Finally, the following example proves that when KwhrKrhw > 2 and
Kwh0
Krhw
< 2, IR can be very high. Let Kw = 10
k,
Kr = 1, hr = 1, hw = (1  10k) where k is a very large integer. Then, we have KwhrKrhw ﬃ 10
k þ 1þ 1
10k1 and
Kwh0
Krhw
ﬃ 1þ 10k
110k. Therefore, n

d ¼ 10k þ 1 and nc ¼ 1. For general demand rate, we have Qd ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2D
p
and
Qc ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2D
p
10k=2.Now consider the ratio of decentralized total costs over the centralized total costs. It follows thatGrðQdÞ þ GwðQd; ndÞ
GrðQcÞ þ GwðQc ; ncÞ
¼ 1þ 10
k þ 10k
10kþ1
2 10k=2 þ 1
10k=2
!k!1 1:
Hence, using Expression (13), it is easy to see that the improvement rate in this case is almost 100%. h
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nQ
þ ðnQ=P ÞRD
nQ
þ hðn 1ÞQ
2
; 8nP 1: ð25ÞTreating n as a continuous variable, it is straightforward to show that/(n) is a strictly convex function of nwith a
minimizer, denoted by no, where no ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2KD=h
p
=Q. By deﬁnition,w(1) = KD/Q + dQ/PeRD/QP w(n*). Hence,
noting that dQ/Pe < Q/P + 1, we can write (K + R)D/Q + RD/P > w(1)P w(n*). Letting A = (K + R)D/
Q + RD/P, and using Expression (25) in the above inequality we have A > w(n*) > /(n*). Since A > w(n*) > /
(n*) and /(n) is a strictly convex function of n, /(n)  A has two roots leading to nmin and nmax. h
Proof of Proposition 7. Since the buyer’s cost function in Problem I (given by Expression (6)) has the same
structure as in Goyal’s Problem, the pricing mechanism described in this proposition is similar to the one
in Proposition 5, so the proof is also similar to the proof of Proposition 5. However, we need to take into
account the additional case where Qd > Q

c . First, we show that, under the coordinated solution, the buyer
stays in a no-worse situation as far as his/her cost is concerned.
If Qd < Q

c then the buyer’s cost is given by Gr(Q) for Q < Q

c and by Gr(Q)  D · D for QP Qc , where
Gr(Æ) is given by Expression (6). Since Q

c > Q

d and Q

d is the minimizer of Gr(Q), we have GrðQdÞ < GrðQÞ for
Q < Qc and Q 6¼ Qd. For QP Qc , the cost function Gr(Q)  D · D is increasing in Q, and, therefore,
GrðQcÞ < GrðQÞ for Q > Qc . At order quantity Qc , the buyer’s cost is given by GrðQcÞ  D D ¼ GrðQdÞ, and,
as a result, the buyer stays in a no-worse situation by ordering Qc units.
Similarly, if Qd > Q

c then the buyer’s cost is given by Gr(Q) for Q > Q

c and by Gr(Q)  D · D for Q 6 Qc .
For Q 6 Qc , the cost function Gr(Q)  D · D is decreasing in Q, and, therefore, GrðQcÞ < GrðQÞ for Q < Qc .
For Q > Qc , we have GrðQdÞ < GrðQÞ where Q 6¼ Qd. Consequently, Qc minimizes the buyer’s cost under the
coordinated solution, and, at this order quantity, the buyer’s cost is given by GrðQcÞ  D D ¼ GrðQdÞ.
In both cases, i.e., when Qd < Q

c or Q

d > Q

c , under the coordinated solution, the vendor’s proﬁt isðc DÞD GwðQc ; ncÞ ¼ cD GrðQcÞ  GrðQdÞ
  GwðQc ; ncÞ;where Gr(Æ) and Gw(Æ, Æ) are given by Expressions (6) and (16), respectively.
Since ðQc ; ncÞ is the minimizer of Gw(Q,n) + Gr(Qr), we haveGrðQcÞ  GrðQdÞ < GwðQd; ndÞ  GwðQc ; ncÞ;
and it follows thatðc DÞD GwðQc ; ncÞ > cD ðGwðQd; ndÞ  GwðQc ; ncÞÞ  GwðQc ; ncÞ > cD GwðQd; ndÞ:
Consequently, the vendor’s proﬁt under the coordinated solution, i.e., ðc DÞD GwðQc ; ncÞ, is improved rel-
ative to his/her proﬁt in the decentralized setting, i.e., cD GwðQd; ndÞ. Since we concentrate on the case where
the decentralized transactional setting makes economical sense for the vendor, i.e., cD GwðQd; ndÞ > 0, we
also have ðc DÞD GwðQc ; ncÞ > 0 so c > D. h
Proof of Proposition 8. First, we show that, under the coordinated solution, Qc minimizes the buyer’s cost
function in such a way that by ordering this quantity his/her cost does not exceed GrðQdÞ, where Gr(Æ) is given
by Expression (17), leaving the buyer in a no-worse situation relative to the decentralized setting.
• Qd < Q

c :
– If Qd < Q

c and Q

c P Ql2 , under the coordinated solution, the buyer’s cost is given by Gr(Q) for Q < Q

c
and by GrðQÞ  GrðQcÞ þ GrðQdÞ for QP Qc . Since Qd < Qc and Qd is the minimizer of Gr(Q), we have
GrðQdÞ < GrðQÞ for Q < Qc and Q 6¼ Qd. Let us examine the region QP Qc in two parts; namely,
Qc 6 Q 6 l2P and Q > l2P.Qc 6 Q 6 l2P : Since Ql2 is the economic order quantity when l2 trucks are used and Q

c P Ql2 , we
have GrðQcÞ 6 GrðQÞ for Qc 6 Q 6 l2P . Subtracting GrðQcÞ  GrðQdÞ from both sides of this inequal-
ity results in GrðQdÞ 6 GrðQÞ  GrðQcÞ þ GrðQdÞ. Note that the right hand side of this ﬁnal inequality
is the buyer’s cost under the coordinated solution for QP Qc , and, GrðQdÞ is the buyer’s cost when
Q ¼ Qc .
A. Toptal, S. C¸etinkaya / European Journal of Operational Research 187 (2008) 785–805 805Q > l2P: Using Property 3 in [13], we know that Gr(Q) > Gr(l2P) for Q > l2P. Since Grðl2P ÞP GrðQcÞ,
it follows that GrðQÞ > GrðQcÞ for Q > l2P. Again, subtracting GrðQcÞ  GrðQdÞ from both sides of
this inequality results in GrðQdÞ < GrðQÞ  GrðQcÞ þ GrðQdÞ.
– Considering the case Qd < Q

c and Q

c < Ql2 , we analyze the buyer’s cost function under the coordinated
solution over three regions; namely, Q 6 l1P, l1P < Q 6 Qc , and Q > Qc . The buyer’s cost is given by
Gr(Q) for Q 6 l1P and Q > Qc , and it is given by GrðQÞ  GrðQcÞ þ GrðQdÞ for l1P < Q 6 Qc . Since
Qd is the minimizer of Gr(Q), we have GrðQdÞ < GrðQÞ for Q 6¼ Qd over Q 6 l1P and Q > Qc . Now, let
us consider those Q such that l1P < Q 6 Qc . Since Qc < Ql2 and Ql2 is the economic order quantity when
l2 trucks are used, Gr(Q) is decreasing over l1P < Q 6 Qc , and, hence, GrðQÞ  GrðQcÞ þ GrðQdÞ is
decreasing. This implies that the cost at Q ¼ Qc , given by GrðQdÞ, is less than GrðQÞ  GrðQcÞ þ GrðQdÞ
over l1P < Q < Q

c . It follows that Q

c is the minimizer over Q

c < Ql2 .
• Qd > Q

c : It is easy to show that Gr(Q) is decreasing in Q over l1P < Q 6 Qc (see [7] where some speciﬁc
properties of the cost function in Expression (17) are examined). The remainder of the proof builds on this
result and is similar to the previous case, and, hence, the details are omitted here.
In all cases of the proposition, the vendor’s average annual proﬁt is improved relative to the decentralized
setting. This is because, Qc is the minimizer of Gw(Qr,n) + Gr(Q) and GrðQdÞ 6 GrðQcÞ where Gw(Æ, Æ) and Gr(Æ)
are given by Expressions (16) and (17), respectively. It follows that0 6 GrðQcÞ  GrðQdÞ < GwðQd; ndÞ  GwðQc ; ncÞ;
and, therefore, GwðQd; ndÞ > GwðQc ; ncÞ. hReferences
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